
PROGRESSIVE ERA DIPLOMAT: LLOYD C. GRISCOM AND TRADE EXPANSION

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The Progressive Era, from the late 1890s to the entry of the United States into World War One, was marked by a professional commitment to global trade expansion on the part of the State Department and the McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Philosophically, the United States embraced the belief that a liberal, democratic, free-enterprise political and economic system would advance human progress on every continent, and that global free trade would remove many causes of war and conflict. Such a policy position attracted young and talented foreign service officers to serve in the American diplomatic corps. One young man was Lloyd C. Griscom, heir to one of the great American shipping fortunes. Griscom's career as a diplomat in Turkey, Persia, Japan, Brazil, and Italy between 1899 and 1909 revealed much about American political and economic interests during a period when the United States emerged as a major power.

While on vacation in Florida in the spring of 1891, Lloyd C. Griscom (1872–1959), heir to one of America's great fortunes, became ill with typhoid fever. During a difficult three weeks when his life hung in the balance, young Griscom had two noteworthy experiences. Suffering from a high fever, Griscom became violent, and sought to escape his hospital room by throwing himself from an upper story window. Saved by his physician, Griscom fell into a delirium from which he later remembered a recurring and vivid dream.

I was again in London at the Foreign Office reception. I could see plainly the great marble stairway. At the top stood the Prince and Princess of Wales and behind them in the candlelight ambassadors and ministers and royalty in all their regalia. I too tried to go up, but my head buzzed, and I reeled. I realized I was very drunk and was overcome by the disgrace I was bringing upon my country.¹

Griscom's illness altered his life profoundly. He dropped his plans to enter law school after graduation from the Wharton School of Economics.

Instead he believed he was meant to pursue a career in the diplomatic corps. In a short time, he came to trust in the prophetic nature of his illness, his salvation from death, and his dream.

A few months before his illness, Lloyd Griscom had visited the U.S. Embassy in London. At the age of nineteen he was very impressed with the American Minister to the Court of St. James, Robert Todd Lincoln. He noted that "No matter how successful I might be at law, I was certain I could not possibly find it so exciting as diplomacy."² But how could Griscom hope to embark on a diplomatic career when his father, Clement Acton Griscom, expected him to complete law school and enter family business operations? Griscom's dream revealed interesting elements of guilt in his personality for he was both drunk (against his father's belief in temperance), and aspiring to recognition without having first earned the right to it. Clearly he feared he was not measuring up to his father's expectations.

Lloyd C. Griscom was a young man well-born and well-placed with opportunities not usually granted to young adults. The son of financier and shipbuilder Clement Griscom, and Frances Biddle Canby of Philadelphia, the Griscom family settled in colonial New Jersey from Wales in 1680.³ Over generations, members of the family became major land owners and merchants. In time, the Griscoms became prominent among the liberal wing of Quakers known as Hicksites.⁴

It was Lloyd's father, Clement Acton, however, who rose to new prominence in the industrial era as president of the International Navigation Co.⁵ In 1902, he became associated with J.P. Morgan & Co., and founded the International Mercantile Marine Co., a combination of 5 steamship lines comprised of 136 vessels. In addition, he was also associated with various banks, railroads, insurance companies and industrial corporations. These included the Pennsylvania Railroad, Westinghouse, and the United Gas Improvement Co. among others.

Clement Griscom's philosophy hinged on the Quaker idea that the businessman had the best opportunity to promote peace in the modern world.⁶ Lloyd Griscom's decision to modify his father's wishes was a bold stroke. His two older brothers, Clement and Rodman, and his sister's husband, Samuel Bettle, had all followed family tradition and joined various family businesses.⁷ As the youngest child, Lloyd was intent on carving out his own niche and his own identity.⁸ He wanted to avoid his "father's shadow" and in this pursuit he was encouraged by such people as Henry Adams, Senator and Mrs. Donald Cameron, and British diplomat, Cecil Spring-Rice.⁹ His fortuitous illness and dramatic dream provided added resolve.

This dream experience is psychologically significant for it is similar to common experiences documented by Erik Erikson and Michael Goodich

relating to generational conflict and career decisions.¹⁰ Lloyd Griscom fit into a well-established pattern of behavior, and in addition provided an important link to an emerging social profile of modern foreign service officers in the free enterprise era. He was a young man from a northeast urban community; he was old stock northern European Protestant; his education was Ivy League.¹¹

In 1899, after serving in the U.S. military during the Spanish–American War, Griscom realized his dream of a significant diplomatic appointment when he was appointed Secretary of the U.S. Legation in Constantinople, Turkey.¹² From 1899 to 1901, Griscom served under the responsible tutelage of Oscar Straus, U.S. Minister to Turkey. Here Griscom helped negotiate a settlement of American missionary claims after the Armenian massacres of 1894, and arrange for the sale of an American made cruiser to the Turkish navy.¹³ As the son of an American shipping magnate, Griscom was perceived by the Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, as a man of just the proper temperament to conduct the delicate transactions between the two nations.¹⁴ New trade agreements brought American commerce and peaceful conflict resolution to Turkish–American relations.

Griscom's part in the successful Turkish negotiations, and his family contacts led to a major appointment in 1901. At age 28, he became U.S. Minister to Persia. Elated with State Department recognition, Griscom was surprised in meetings with Secretary of State John Hay, Bureau Chief Sydney Smith, and Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee that he would be given a free hand to develop and expand American markets as well as oversee the establishment of transit rights and petroleum resources.¹⁵ In the early twentieth century the economy of Persia was still medieval, but its potential wealth and strategic location made it a bone of contention among modern industrial states including Britain and Russia.

The British sphere of influence was in southeast Persia. Concessions had been granted there for telegraph lines, railroads, canals, dams, banks and industrial plants. The Russian sphere was in the northwest and concessions were similar to those of the British. Heavy loans by both nations to the Kajar Dynasty rulers paved the way for a division of Persia into spheres in a manner not unlike that which existed in China. As the recognized champion of the Open Door Policy, the United States was encouraged by Persia to offset the growing power of Britain and Russia, much as the Manchu government in China supported American Open Door policies promoting equal opportunity of trade and national sovereignty for the host nation.

As an advocate of the Open Door Policy Lloyd Griscom was especially worried about Russian efforts to gain a monopoly to link Teheran by toll road with Armenia in order to exploit mining and oil resources. Under earlier arrangements, Persia was not permitted to seek new loans from

any powers other than Russia. If the Shah's regime was in danger of non-payment of principal or interest, Russia had the power to operate Persian customs and treasury departments to allow for the payment of debts in an orderly fashion. Britain had a similar arrangement in its own sphere.¹⁶

Griscom perceived that the United States had a natural market for the construction of industrial plants and transportation facilities as well as the exportation of many manufactured goods.¹⁷ To achieve his goals, and free Persia from the control of Britain and Russia, Griscom energetically proposed the establishment of a direct steamship line to the Persian Gulf in order to force open the doors of trade and free Persia from compromising its independence.¹⁸ Furthermore he proposed the creation of an "American Agency" to promote American business interests in Teheran, Isphahan, and Bushire to confront the stranglehold of European competition. Eventually, Griscom's proposals were adopted. However, Griscom himself was given a more prominent role in advancing the Open Door Policy in East Asia. In December 1902, he received word that he was appointed U.S. Minister to Japan.¹⁹

Given the State Department's growing concern for Far Eastern affairs, there was no question that this was a major promotion, and testimony of the Department's high regard for Griscom's efforts, abilities, and his role as a champion of American economic interests in global markets. Before taking on his duties in Tokyo, Griscom was the guest of Theodore Roosevelt in the White House. The President emphasized what a great opportunity Japan would be for Griscom to prove his worth as a progressive champion of the Open Door principles and the promotion of peaceful trade.²⁰

Initially upon taking over his duties in Japan, Griscom was informed by Secretary Hay that his most delicate problem would be Japanese resentment of California race exclusion laws. In addition, a few other thorny issues existed concerning Japanese confiscation of properties owned by American corporations doing business in Japan, severe restrictions on the operations of American life insurance companies writing policies in Japan, intellectual property difficulties, and discriminatory tariff policies against American oil firms, especially Standard Oil. Most of these issues, however, would be settled in somewhat routine fashion.²¹

Two very significant matters emerged unexpectedly—the Russo–Japanese War of 1904–05, and financier–industrialist Edward H. Harriman's proposal for a joint American and Japanese transportation system. Griscom's management of these two eventually interrelated issues earned him the reputation of being one of America's most effective diplomats. His work in Japan led to Secretary Hay choosing him for promotion to First Assistant Secretary of State.²²

The Russo–Japanese War came about as a result of a long-standing rivalry between the two expansionist powers over economic and territorial

concessions in Manchuria and Korea. Both governments envisioned a form of manifest destiny in which each power would become the leading force in Asian development. In addition, a long-term objective was to influence the course of China's growth as a modern industrial nation.

The Roosevelt administration saw tsarist imperialism as the more pronounced danger to United States interests in East Asia, and especially American economic activities in Manchuria where oil, timber, cotton, and flour products were primary trade items. Russia had used the excuse of the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 to interfere with American corporate interests in Mukden, Manchuria. Japan seemed the obvious counter-poise to Russian ambitions.

When Japan opted for war to check Russian imperialism in East Asia, Theodore Roosevelt, and his advisers, including Lloyd Griscom, were decidedly sympathetic to the Japanese decision. In fact, the Japanese government floated a number of loans in the United States and Britain (especially among Jewish-American bankers critical of Russian anti-Semitic practices) to help finance the cost of the war. Griscom played a critical role in helping the Japanese government secure American war loans.²³

The war went well for Japan. Russia, facing defeat in spring 1905, agreed to Japanese overtures for a negotiated peace. At the President's discreet suggestion, the belligerents turned to Theodore Roosevelt in June, 1905 to bring the war to a close. Griscom, as minister in Tokyo, was instrumental in gaining Japanese approval for this initiative. At the same time Roosevelt was beginning preparations for the Portsmouth, New Hampshire Conference which would end the war, Griscom was, in turn, being rewarded for his role. He was offered, and he accepted, an appointment as First Assistant Secretary of State by John Hay. Unfortunately Hay's untimely death nullified Griscom's move into the State Department's inner circle. Newly appointed Secretary of State Elihu Root would, of course, choose his own assistants.²⁴

Griscom, however, had little time to dwell on this disappointment. In the remaining months of 1905 he was far too active in trying to solidify the agreement between the United States and Japan for a trans-global transportation system under the corporate banner of Edward H. Harriman. Griscom had always been an advocate for peaceful trade expansion. In a speech to the American Association in Yokohama, Japan, Griscom stated:

The fact is that in modern times the really valuable work of a diplomat abroad is becoming less and less political and more and more commercial. . . . Sooner or later we must recognize that the only work which will justify our political existence will be the work we do in the advance guard of commerce.²⁵

Lloyd Griscom was a model of the professional diplomat in the Progressive Era who combined political tact with an appreciation for economic and technological growth in a world of free trade and global partnerships.²⁶ Even before Harriman made his unique proposal, Griscom sought approval from Tokyo for the American owned China Investment and Construction Co. to build a railroad in Fukien, China. It should be noted that since China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Beijing made no concessions to foreign powers without first consulting with Tokyo. Fukien province had become a Japanese sphere of influence and illustrated how open door concepts of free trade were thwarted by the old imperialism. Griscom hoped to play a role in breaking down these barriers. The Harriman proposal, if successful, might set a precedent for international cooperation in the spirit of the Open Door Policy.

With the financial and political support of the United States for Japan in the Russian war, the Tokyo newspaper *Jigi Shimpo* called for a direct commercial union between the United States and Japan. Cooperation, not conflict, became the watchword. Another daily, *Kokumin Shimbun*, the chief government organ, noted that, "The purpose of Japan, like that of America, is to promote universal peace, civilization and the cause of Humanity. . . ." Both Japan and the United States were said to favor regional coexistence. Griscom strongly echoed these sentiments.²⁷

With Harriman's arrival in Japan in July, 1905, the time seemed right for his joint economic proposal. His presence in Tokyo, along with the President's daughter, Alice Roosevelt, and Secretary of War, William H. Taft, signaled the Roosevelt administration's support for the venture. This was especially important given the Justice Department prosecution of Harriman's Northern Securities Co. for anti-trust activity. Roosevelt was consistent and true to progressive beliefs in both enterprises. Nothing was personal. Promoting freer trade would be the result of both international cooperation, and restoring free competition by restricting monopolistic practices.

Harriman was enthusiastic about the administration's support:

Griscom, there's no doubt about it. If I can secure control of the South Manchurian RR from Japan, I'll buy the Chinese Eastern RR from Russia, acquire trackage over the Trans-Siberian to the Baltic, and establish a line of steamers to the United States. Then I can connect with the American transcontinental lines, and join up with the Pacific Mail and the Japanese TransPacific steamers. It'll be the most marvelous system in the world. We'll girdle the earth.²⁸

Griscom clearly endorsed Harriman's Japanese negotiation, and went even further to suggest that railroads in Korea be linked to the project. But Harriman himself was the key. In addition to his ties to the Northern

Securities Co., the Union Pacific, Southern Pacific, and nine other railroads, he was also president of the Pacific Mail Steamship Co., and an associate of Kuhn, Loeb & Co.—a major financial backer of Japan's war against Russia. If anyone could get concessions from Japan, it would have to be Edward H. Harriman.²⁹

Griscom made a tough and thorough presentation to Japanese Prime Minister Katsura, Finance Minister Sakatoni, and elder statesman Inouye. Persuasively he emphasized that: 1) Harriman's plan would strengthen Japan's status with creditor nations and give Japan access to new credit sources; 2) the plan would realize considerable profit for Japan and help defray the cost of its war with Russia; 3) Harriman had made the pilgrimage to Tokyo thus showing great respect; 4) Costs would be kept lower by acting now; 5) Many Japanese corporations could be invited to take share in the enterprise; 6) the joint venture would bring Japan and the United States much closer politically and economically.³⁰

Initially Griscom succeeded in convincing Japanese leaders to sign the agreement. A preliminary pact was drawn up on 12 October 1905. Harriman's syndicate was incorporated under Japanese law. On 15 October, however, Foreign Minister Komura returned from the Portsmouth negotiation to announce Russia's final refusal to pay a financial indemnity. Japan blamed Theodore Roosevelt for Russia's recalcitrance. In truth, Roosevelt did not favor the payment because it would hurt the balance of power in East Asia. As a consequence of the Portsmouth outcome, Tokyo cancelled the preliminary Harriman agreement, resulting in the postponement of any final accord.³¹

Harriman never realized his grand scheme. Within four years he would be dead. Significantly, new suspicions emerged between Tokyo and Washington as competing national interests set the two powers in opposite directions. In December 1905, Lloyd Griscom received word that he was being transferred. He was to be the first United States envoy raised to the rank of Ambassador to Brazil. Griscom left Japan with mixed feelings. He was completely taken aback by Japan's refusal to reconsider the Harriman plan which potentially could have more than compensated for the costs of the Russian war. Years later he would mark this juncture as the beginning of persistent tension between the United States and Japan.³²

Lloyd Griscom's appointment to Brazil coincided with Roosevelt's desire to bring about a change in the Latin American policy of the United States prior to the Third Pan American Conference to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 1906. To set the table, Secretary of State Elihu Root was sent on a good will tour of South America to herald the change in Roosevelt's policy away from "Big Stick" diplomacy. In its place would emerge a Pan American policy that placed major emphasis on economic or dollar diplomacy three years before President Taft would use the term to describe his own administration's foreign policy.³³

Roosevelt expected Griscom to remove the stigma of Yankee imperialism in Latin America. The Rio conference was to be a watershed for the new Pan American policy. The first step in this new program was to reorganize and expand the International Bureau of American Republics, and rename it the Pan American Union.³⁴ The new union was enlarged as an organization to promote hemispheric trade, and secure ratification of political resolutions and conventions in the spirit of collective prosperity and political parity.

Following this initial change, the United States announced a seven-point program designed to encourage better economic and political relations with the South American republics: 1) Create American branch banks to promote hemispheric trade; 2) Coordinate credit systems among the republics; 3) Urge American manufacturers to produce goods specifically for Latin markets; 4) Encourage American businesses to use Spanish and Portuguese in addition to English in the hemisphere; 5) Send engineers to Latin American to promote industry and technology; 6) Adopt a new attitude of mutual respect among American diplomats and consular officials serving in Latin America; 7) Improve communications and transportation throughout the hemisphere including the completion of the Pan American Railway from Canada to Argentina.³⁵

Lloyd Griscom was considered the key to obtaining support for this new program from Brazil, potentially the most significant republic on the continent. Griscom's work contributed to the political alignment of the United States and Brazil, and to the expansion of American markets there as well. Despite earlier tariff issues, a 20 percent tariff decrease was negotiated on a large variety of products. In addition, Griscom was able to alter the Portuguese policy of forcing American manufacturers to send sample goods for Brazilian markets through Portugal. This diplomatic initiative removed a major barrier to more direct and expanded trade between the United States and Brazil.³⁶

Having succeeded in the implementation of Roosevelt's new Latin American policy, Griscom had now become the number one administration diplomat in both Asia and Latin America. There was one other diplomatic honor, short of an appointment in Washington, to be bestowed. That was achieved in 1907 with his appointment to one of Europe's primary posts—Ambassador to Rome.

Had Theodore Roosevelt decided to run for reelection in 1908 and won, Griscom almost certainly would have been given an appointment in the Department of State.³⁷ However, Roosevelt's decision not to run meant that there would be wholesale resignations coming in 1909. Taft's victory over William J. Bryan insured the end of Lloyd Griscom's diplomatic career. His last assignment in Rome was of a humanitarian nature as supervisor of the Messina earthquake relief effort. With 50,000 dead and

tens of thousands injured and homeless, the United States took major responsibility for international relief.³⁸

Griscom took great satisfaction in this last duty. To some extent, it would serve as preparation for later service in post-World War I Europe as a liaison for General John J. Pershing and humanitarian relief efforts. Although Lloyd Griscom spent the remaining forty years of his life in the private sector, mostly as a newspaper owner and publisher, Griscom had made significant contributions to Progressive Era foreign policy.

Perhaps the most accurate appraisal of Lloyd Griscom's career is to view his service as representative of the transition in the diplomatic corps during the Progressive Era.³⁹ In the early twentieth century the "caretaker" approach to foreign affairs, in the hands of socially prominent amateurs and political hacks, was giving way to aggressive, professional strategies of more knowledgeable and sophisticated individuals. Although drawing from the families of higher social status (of both wealth and tradition), the diplomatic service in the Progressive Era was moving toward structured institutional reform. In the pre- and post-World War I era, a career oriented middle class foreign service emerged based on the concept of civil service, and enacted in 1924 as the Rogers Act. This act was not a radical departure, but a culmination of an ongoing struggle to remove diplomatic service from the hands of narrow political interests, and create a professional service.

Progressives believed that the positive accomplishments of mankind depended upon the peaceful and dedicated efforts of capable people operating in an efficient system of government. Lloyd Griscom was part of a well-documented group of young diplomats who included Wilbur Carr, Joseph Grew, Loy Henderson, George F. Kennan, William Phillips, Hugh Gibson, James Dunn, Charles Bohlen, Hugh Wilson, and others with similar values and career trajectories.⁴⁰ Modern American diplomacy for a major world power began in the Progressive Era. Progressive Era diplomats helped to formulate and implement a new foreign policy appropriate for the new internationalism based on a liberal, democratic, free-enterprise world order designed to promote global cooperation. That ideal continues to persist in enlightened diplomatic circles.

NOTES

1. Lloyd C. Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking* (New York, 1940), p. 25. Lloyd C. Griscom Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Also see Griscom, "Reminiscences," Columbia Oral History Collection (1951), Butler Library, Columbia University, New York City.
2. Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking*, p. 20.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
5. *Dictionary of American Biography*, VIII, p. 6.
6. Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking*, p. 26.
7. For discussions of the make up of the changing diplomatic corps see Lloyd S. Etheredge, *A World Of Men: The Sources of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: 1978); Elmer Plischke, *U.S. Diplomats and Their Missions: A Profile of American Diplomatic Emissaries Since 1778* (Washington, D.C.: 1975); Robert Schulzinger, *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook, and Style of U.S. Foreign Service Officers, 1908–1931* (Middleton, CN: 1975); Rachel West, *The Department of State on the Eve of the First World War* (Athens, GA: 1978).
8. Griscom, “Reminiscences,” *Columbia Oral History*, p. 6. See Frank Sulloway, *Born to Rebel* (New York: 1996).
9. *Ibid.*
10. Erik Erikson, *Young Luther* (New York: 1958), and Michael Goodich, “Childhood and Adolescence among the Thirteenth Century Saints,” *History of Childhood Quarterly* I (Fall, 1973), 283–309.
11. Bernard Mennis, *American Foreign Policy Officials: Who They Are and What They Believe*, (Columbus, OH: 1971), p. 82f.
12. Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking*, p. 117f.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 134f. Also see Lewis Thomas and Richard Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran* (Cambridge, MA: 1952), p. 53f; Oscar Straus, *Under Four Administrators*, (Boston: 1922), p. 155; *Despatches From the United States Minister to Turkey, 1899–1900*, Microcopy 46, Roll 66.
14. Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking*, pp. 180–181.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 198f.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 199; Griscom to Hay, 16 December 1901, 1 April 11, 1902; *Despatches From the United States Minister to Persia, 1883–1906*, Microcopy 223, Roll 10.
17. Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking*, p. 203; Griscom to Hay, 4 June 1902, *Despatches, Persia*.
18. Griscom to W.P. Wilson, Dir. of Philadelphia Commercial Museum, 30 September 1902; Griscom to Hay, 25 November 1902, both in *Despatches, Persia*. On railroad concessions, see Griscom report, “Russian Railroads in Persia,” *Consular Reports*, 1902, LXIX, 166.
19. Griscom to Wilson, 30 September 1902, *Despatches, Persia*.
20. Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking*, p. 222. Also see *Columbia Oral History*, p. 45f. Griscom’s personal friendship with Roosevelt grew out of an earlier friendship with the President’s older sister Anna. For general background see Edmund Morris, *Theodore Rex* (New York: 2001).
21. Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking*, pp. 223–264; *Despatches, Japan, 1855–1906*, Microcopy 133, Rolls 76–79, *passim*, but particularly Griscom to Hay, 30 September, 14, 24 November, 7 December 1903, 31 July 1904.
22. “Merit and Diplomacy,” *The Outlook* 85 (26 January 1907), p. 213; Hugh Willard, “Lloyd C. Griscom: An American Diplomat of the New Type,” *Putnam’s Magazine* VI (September 1909). Among studies which mentioned Griscom’s role are Raymond Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan* (Seattle: 1966), Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897–1911* (Cambridge: 1972); Lewis Gould, *The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt* (Lawrence, KS: 1991).

23. Griscom to Hay, 6 August, 30 November 1904, *Despatches, Japan* roll 78; Iriye, pp. 112–113; Griscom to Rodman E. Griscom, 29 January 1904, Griscom Papers, Box 3, Library of Congress.
24. Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking*, p. 256.
25. H. Willard, p. 700.
26. H. Willard, p. 701; Griscom to Hay, 12 October 1904, *Despatches, Japan* Roll 79.
27. *Jigi Shimpō*, 18 January 1905; *Kokumin Shimbun*, 25 January 1905, both in *Despatches, Japan*, roll 79; “Remarks of Count Katsura,” Griscom Papers, Box 3, Library of Congress. In pursuit of these interests, Griscom served as president of the American Asiatic Association.
28. Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking*, p. 263. Also see Maury Klein, *The Life and Legend of E.H. Harriman* (Chapel Hill: 2000); Frederick Marks, *Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt* (Lincoln, NE: 1979); Kenneth Wimmel, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet* (Dulles, VA: 1998).
29. “Remarks of Count Katsura,” Griscom Papers, Box 3, Library of Congress.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking*, p. 264.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
33. U.S. Congress, *Report of the Delegates to the Third International Conference of American States*, p. 43. Also see Emily Rosenberg, *Dollar Diplomacy* (New York: 1999).
34. Now the Organization of American States. Also see Edward Crapol, *James G. Blaine, Architect of Empire* (Wilmington, DE: 2000).
35. Philip Jessup, *Elihu Root* (New York: 1938), I, pp. 490.
36. E. Bradford Burns, *The Unwritten Alliance: Rio Branco and the Brazilian–American Relations* (New York: 1966), pp. 113–114; Griscom to Root, 4 July 1906, *Despatches, Brazil*, Roll 74; Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking*, pp. 272–277.
37. Griscom, *Diplomatically Speaking*, pp. 324, 449.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 305.
39. Graham Stuart, *American Diplomatic and Consular Practice* (New York: 1952), pp. 98–106; Waldo Heinrichs, “Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of American Career Diplomacy,” in John Braeman, ed., *Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy* (Columbus, OH: 1971); Jerry Israel, ed., *Building the Organizational Society* (New York: 1971); Martin Weil, *A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service* (New York: 1978); Richard Werking, *The Master Architects: Building The United States Foreign Service, 1890–1913* (Lexington, KY: 1977); Salvatore Prisco, *Industrialism, Foreign Expansion and the Progressive Era* (Piscataway, N.J.: 2001).
40. Henry Mattox, *The Twilight of Amateur Diplomacy* (New York: 1989); Cathal Nolan, ed., *Notable American Ambassadors Since 1775* (New York: 1998).

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